Count XXlX:
Any law or case which grants or forms a basis for Judicial Immunity is Unconstitutional, Vague, and against International treaties. Judicial Immunity evinces a design to reduce the people under absolute Despotism and creates an illegal Oligarchy/Nobility, and limitation on the power of the people of the United States. Ordering transfer of the underlying assets of a Limited Liability Company, for which members (Mr. Knize) have no ownership, or overriding a contract by legislating from the bench, or creating a mosaic distribution scheme which transfers non-transferable assets; is NOT a function normally performed by a judge.
Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their criminal acts, and though there are no criminal penaltys in Civil RICO, that proceeding should yield civil damages found from criminal acts.. Since both treason and the interference with interstate commerce are criminal acts, no judge has immunity to engage in such acts. Defendant gives notice he will place a challenge to Subject Matter Jurisdiction in event of dismissal from the court on grounds of immunity. A Motion to Dismiss on that claim invariably violates the Separation of Powers; judges may NOT legislate from the bench, Congress’ will to provide relief for injury cannot be ruled away by the Judiciary, as it would be an act of Law making, not interpretation. In a non-criminal proceeding, there are still grounds to abolish immunity; and grant damages; the Constitution never granted Judges the power to give themselves the privilege, but indeed granted the people the right to say no to it, and Am. 9 guarantees priority to citizens the right to sue government officials under common law Tort. I demand Strict Scrutiny be employed on the Question in a proper hearing. Further, we can assume arguendo that the Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984) decision applies equally in Bivens actions against judges in civil and criminal cases. In 1996, Congress enacted the Federal Courts Improvement Act ("FCIA"), Pub.L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847 (1996), in which it amended §§ 1983 to provide that "injunctive relief shall not be granted" in an action brought against "a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity ... unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." The ACT is Unconstitutional and I challenge it through strict scrutiny.
"Woe unto them that call evil good (Judicial Independence), and good evil (accountability); that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter! Woe unto them that are wise in their own eyes, and prudent in their own sight!...who acquit the guilty for a bribe, but deny justice to the innocent" Isaiah 5:20, 21, 23
"Experience hath shewn, that even under the best forms [of government] those entrusted with power have, in time, and by slow operations, perverted it into tyranny."” It [is] inconsistent with the principles of civil liberty, and contrary to the natural rights of the other members of the society, that any body of men therein should have authority to enlarge their own powers, prerogatives or emoluments without restraint." --Thomas Jefferson: Virginia Allowance Bill, 1778. Papers 2:231
This Court must, and has a duty to address the Questions of Law through Strict Scrutiny Test surrounding this claim at a proper hearing. Marbury v. Madison (1803) states:
” The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. [The] government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right. . .”
If the government is a government of men, the review standard is found in the common
community, and not by judges who wish to protect their own nobility of black robes:
“Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." --Thomas Jefferson: Declaration of Independence, 1776. ME 1:29, Papers 1:4 “The will of the nation is the only thing essential to be regarded." -- Thomas Jefferson to Governor Morris, 1792. ME 9:36
If we are a government of Laws, all the laws must stem first from the Constitution:
"[The purpose of a written constitution is] to bind up the several branches of government by certain laws, which, when they transgress, their acts shall become nullities; to render unnecessary an appeal to the people, or in other words a rebellion, on every infraction of their rights, on the peril that their acquiescence shall be construed into an intention to surrender those rights." - Jefferson: Notes on Virginia Q.XIII, 1782. ME 2:178
Judges who we trust with preserving the rights of freedom and liberty guaranteed by our Constitution to protect our people from tyranny and government oppression by prescribing limits upon the Constitution show bias to our government, rule against the people and the Constitution, destroy of our prosperity and happiness, and make us victim to their abuses and tyranny through their obvious abuses of power. Nothing in the Const. grants immunity. Treason; applies to self-granted immunity without the people’s consent as a crime of betraying one's country, especially by attempting to overthrow the sovereign people of our nation and Am. 9 contract rights or by being a subverting government action by undermining the power and authority of the Judiciary rather than to protect the people against unwarranted deprivation of property. The legislature is just as guilty when it bypasses the same requirement of consent, by being influenced by the Judiciary, over the people, to pass laws which put Judges in an untouchable class. I challenge any law so made by them as being Constitutionally repugnant. This court case will allow some voice in the proper judicial branch forum to make the test of consent, as it should correctly be done.
See U.S. Constitution Article VI, Paragraph 2 and 3: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in the pursuance thereof; …under the authority of the United States, (the fifty states individually) shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”
"The true principles of our Constitution... are wisely opposed to all perpetuations of power, and to every practice which may lead to hereditary establishments." --Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Bloodgood and Hammond, 1809. ME 12:318 "A court has no affections; but those of the people whom they govern influence their decisions, even in the most arbitrary
governments." --Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 1785. ME 5:12, Papers 8:228 "The original error [was in] establishing a judiciary independent of the nation, and which, from the citadel of the law, can turn its guns on those they were meant to defend, and control and fashion their proceedings to its own will." --Thomas Jefferson to John Wayles Eppes, 1807. FE 9:68 “The rights of citizens are not limited to those specifically enumerated in the Constitution. The Ninth Amendment protects all other rights that are retained by the people, and that are not specifically named."It is an essential attribute of the jurisdiction of every country to preserve peace, to punish acts in breach of it, and to restore property taken by force within its limits." -- Jefferson to Governor Morris, 1793.
The balance of Title 42, section 1981 of the Civil Rights Code states, "citizens shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind"
as long as they remain citizens, judges would be unconstitutional to allocate privileged rights to their own immunity, by their own vote and vote by Lawyer-Politians. Only a handful of judges have granted Judicial immunities for a whole nation. In doing so they undermined the Congress by surpassing interpretation of the Constitution to actually making laws, an unlawful act. They didn’t even refer to the Constitution to do it, there was never any interpretation of the Constitution. I allege Judicial Immunity is inconsistent with the principles of civil liberty, and contrary to the natural rights of the other members of the society, that any body of men therein should have authority to enlarge their own powers, prerogatives or emoluments without restraint. So, this challenge under Strict Test is necessary. Immunity deprives me, and other citizens of their First and Fourteenth Am. Rights. It is not narrowly tailored for judges to say they are free to commit crimes or even be malicious without due recourse. The excuse of Judicial Independence DOES NOT FLY. You cannot fool the people about this. Do a poll and you will see.
OFFICIAL TAKE: “requires that the judiciary, as a system of courts, function and be perceived to function according to law. This in turn requires that individual judges yield some intra institutional independence The judiciary is not exempt from the requirement of accountability to the people it serves for the proper performance of its duties .“ Institute for Court Management; Court Executive Development Program Phase III Project, May 2006
Also abiding by Treaties follows a necessity: The United States is bound by Treaties, entered in good faith with the United Nations, requiring that it provide effective remedies and redress for violations of Constitutional Rights, "notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity" and to "develop the possibilities of judicial remedy." See The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; U.N. Gen. Assem. Res. 2200 A(XXI) of 16 Dec. 1966; Ratified by the U.S. Senate in June 1992. See Article 2. See also the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Gen. Assem. Res. 217-A(III) of 10 Dec 48; Art. 8. It states: "Everyone has the right to an EFFECTIVE REMEDY by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law." [emphasis added]. It is time to look at the full breadth of law. It is long overdue for the Federal Court (District Court must address the treaties violations before it should rule a failure to state a claim because they think JI exist) to revisit cases which granted judges immunity in light of the impact of Constitutions on the evolution of "well ordered systems of jurisprudence." Bradley was eighty years out-of-date when it was written to create JI. Its teachings are now two centuries past their prime and cannot survive in a world of limited government and constitutional rights. The Treaties mentioned are the "handwriting on the wall" before the entire world: "Judicial Immunity" is an embarrassing, and dying institution.
"Single acts of tyranny may be ascribed to the accidental opinion of a day; but a series of oppressions, begun at a distinguished period and pursued unalterably through every change of ministers, too plainly prove a deliberate, systematic plan of reducing [a people]
to slavery." Thomas Jefferson: Rights of British America, 1774. ME 1:193, Papers 1:125
Placing the judges above the People, turns the principle that the People are sovereign and destroys a government by the consent of the people. In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), an 8/1 decision written by Chief Justice Warren, that affirmed immunity for judges is clearly voidable under section 1983 civil rights statute, rights which held explicitly imposed liability [on] Every person who, under color of [law] …… subjects or causes …… any citizen of the United States .. to the deprivation of any rights ...secured by the constitution and laws..[,].
is a decision that is absent of any Constitutional basis/authority for absolute judicial immunity. To his credit and to wit, Justice Douglas wrote in his lone dissent at 559:
““…… The court’’s ruling is not justified by the admitted need for a vigorous and independent judiciary, is not commanded by the common-law doctrine of judicial immunity, and does not follow from inexorably from our prior decisions. …… [P] To most, ‘‘every person’’ would mean every person, not every person except judges.”” [Continuing at 562:] The position that Congress did not intend to change the common-law rule of judicial immunity ignores the fact that every member of Congress who spoke on the issue assumed that the words of the statute meant what they said and judges would be liable. …… [P] The section’’s purpose was to provide redress for the deprivation of civil rights. It was recognized that certain members of the judiciary were instruments of oppression and were partially responsible for the wrongs to be remedied. The parade of cases coming to this Court shows that a similar condition now obtains in some of the States. Some states courts have been instruments of suppression of civil rights.”” Continuing at 565:] ““The argument that the actions of officials must not be subjected to judicial scrutiny because to do so would have an inhibiting effect on their work, is but a more sophisticated manner of saying ‘‘The King can do no wrong.’’ (ftnt. 5 omitted.) Chief Justice Cockburn long ago disposed of the argument that liability would deter judges: ‘‘I can not believe that judges ... would fail to discharge their duty faithfully and fearlessly according to their oaths and consciences …… from any fear of exposing themselves to actions at law. I am persuaded that the number of such actions would be infinitely small and would be easily disposed of. While, on the other hand, I can easily conceive cases in which judicial opportunity might be so perverted and abused for the purpose of injustice as that, on sound principles, the authors of such wrong ought to be responsible to the parties wronged.’’ Dawkins v Lord Parulet, LR 5 QB 94, 110 (C.J. Cockburn, dissenting).””
“Congress by its words and meaning enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and that meaning included judges to be held responsible to an injured plaintiff for the deprivation of Constitutional Rights. Any judge made case (BRADLEY) finding to the contrary is hereby challenged as unconstitutional and unlawful. No Court has ever challenged the Constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and therefore said Congressionally enacted legislation stands as law. The only way to change an act of Congress is by an act of Congress. No judge can change it and any such findings and changes are not to be upheld in Federal Courts as lawful. No changes in the wording have ever been made to Title 42 U.S.C.A. 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 and therefore these Congressionally enacted laws are enforceable in the Federal Courts” See RANDALL V. BRIGHAM, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 19 L.Ed. 285 (1869). BUTZ V. ECONOMOU, 438 U.S. 506, 98 S.Ct. 2910 (1978)
A look at what some legal commentaries have said on the issue is helpful here. In...
““Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983”” 79 Yale L.J. 322 (1969), it is written at p.322: ““…… This Note contends that the congressional intent of Section 1983 and the policies underlying this exemption do not support a grant of judicial immunity, but rather argue for judicial liability under an actual malice standard. (ftnt. 3 omitted.) [Continuing at 337:] [P] But whatever the long term results of imposing liability, there is no adequate rationale——in history or policy——for altogether exempting judicial officers from liability under section 1983 …””
In ““Suing Judges: History and Theory”” 31 South Carolina L.Rev. 201 (1980) Jay M.
Feinman and Roy S. Cohen wrote at p.203:
““We conclude that statements such as that in Bradley are inadequate history at two levels, reflecting judicial misunderstanding of both what the law was and how and why it developed. Actually, English law began with a position of general judicial liability and developed only limited exceptions on ground irrelevant to a discussion of judicial liability today. When the English law was received in the United States, this limited immunity was expanded significantly, notably by James Kent, to limit liability, and throughout the nineteenth century a mixed pattern of judicial liability and immunity existed in America. In Bradley, Justice Field provided a confused reformation of the law, which led to a further limitation of liability. At no point, however, were the advantages and disadvantages of judicial immunity fairly examined. Because the case for immunity is inconclusive and unpersuasive on historical grounds, we also examine the issue on policy grounds; our analysis proceeds from a thorough review of the case law and literature. We conclude that immunity is indefensible on policy grounds as well ……”” [Continuing at 205:] ““Most of the major judicial liability cases use the common-law origins of judicial immunity as a justification for the doctrine. For example, as noted above, Bradley v. Fisher, { U.S. 13 Wall. 335 (1871)} the case principally relied on by the Court in Stump, used extensive discussion of English case law to show the authority of the rule and to support its continued application. [P] In this section, we demonstrate that these conclusions about English law simply are incorrect. A careful analysis of English law shows that the basic rule was one of liability, that no simple rule of immunity ever existed, and that applications to American law of those instances in which immunity was granted have been inappropriate. In sum, the English law provides little support for a rule of absolute judicial immunity.”” Continuing at 279:] ““…… It is our belief that the decision in Stump should be rejected as too protective of judicial prerogative because it violates a basic tenet of the legal process –– the right of review –– when there would be little cost to the legal system from imposing liability. In ““FEDERAL JURISDICTION”” (3rd Ed) Aspen Law & Business, Aspen Publishers, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky wrote at p.495:
““In numerous specific cases –– ranging from the scope of judicial immunity (ftnt.6 omitted) to the availability of punitive damages (ftnt.7 omitted) –– the Court has focused extensively on the common law of immunities as it existed when section 1983 was adopted. This historical approach is subject to substantial criticism. First, it assumes that the common law was clear about the nature of the immunity to be accorded to particular government officers. Yet usually there was great divergence among the states and there was no firmly established rules. For instance, the Court has emphasized the common law immunity to suits for damages under section 1983. (ftnt.8 omitted.) However, in 1871 only thirteen of thirty-seven states accorded judges such immunities for suits. (ftnt.9 omitted.) In fact, in adopting section 1983, many members of Congress were particularly concerned about unconstitutional conduct by judges. (ftnt.10 omitted.)
[Continuing at 496:] ““Additionally, even if common law principle were clear and discoverable, their relevance to modern doctrines is questionable. The fundamental premises of tort law have changed dramatically over the past 130 years, as have views about the Constitution and individual rights. Undoubtedly many officers occupy far different positions that they did in 1871. Furthermore, there is strong argument that common law tort immunities have little relevance in determining the scope of responsibility for constitutional violations. Some suggest that the Court should abandon the immunity inquiry and leave the entire matter of immunities to the legislature. (ftnt.14 omitted.) Others would prefer a more functional approach to determining the nature of immunities. (ftnt.15 omitted.) Nonetheless, for now, the starting point in the Court’’s analysis of immunity remains the common law of 1871.”” [13 of 37 states accorded judges imunities for suits.]
Note, absent from some cited sources are the questions of whether the Court ever had the constitutional authority/power to give itself immunity and whether that would violate the doctrine of separation of powers. The Courts used Common law rationale:
“There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.
- Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
"The sentiment that ex post facto laws are against natural right is so strong in the United States that few, if any, of the State constitutions have failed to proscribe them. The Federal Constitution indeed interdicts them in criminal cases only; but they are equally unjust in civil as in criminal cases, and the omission of a caution which would have been right, does not justify the doing what is wrong." --Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, 1813. ME 13:327
The effect of the 4th Amendment is to put the courts [232 U.S. 383, 392] of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all intrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws. The tendency of those who execute the laws of the country to obtain property by means of unlawful seizures should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution, and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights. Article 6 -
“This Constitution……. shall be the Supreme Law of the land…Judges in every state shall be bound thereby , any laws……to the Contrary notwithstanding ……judicial officers… shall be bound by Oath Affirmation, to support this Constitution.”
Cases (Bradley, Pierson) and Congressional Acts (JCDA) that concluded JI without consultation to our Constitution are hereby declared VOID by this citizen. The United States Supreme Court has stated that "No State legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his Undertaking to support it". Cooper Vs. Aaron. 358 U.S. 1 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958). If a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void, in re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888), he/she is without jurisdiction, and he/she has engaged in an act or acts TREASON.
Judicial Immunity was developed by means of an unlawful ex post facto law in relation to the Constitution.. Generally speaking, ex post facto laws are seen as a violation of the rule of law as it applies in a free and democratic society. Most common law jurisdictions do not permit retroactive legislation. Furthermore, it is improper to exclude the U. S. Const. and furthermore improper to not refer to it as a primary source for instruction. The starting point then, now, and always - is that Constitution- Article III does not grant the judiciary immunity, especially for acts of operating above the law, Am. 9 gives the people right to say no, not judges to say yes. Maybe that is why Justice Field did not mention the Constitution in Bradley. The Supreme Court has thereafter ignored that there is no Constitutional authority/basis for absolute judicial immunity. But, in fact, Judges giving judges absolute immunity over and above the rights of the People violates the sovereignty of the People, the Constitution, and separation of powers.Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “on its face does not provide for any immunities.” Heck v.Humphrey,114 S.Ct.2364,2375-76 n 1 (1994).
"If once the people become inattentive to the public affairs, you and I, and Congress and Assemblies, Judges and Governors, shall all become wolves. It seems to be the law of our general nature, in spite of individual exceptions." Thomas Jefferson
Absolute immunity sets a dangerous precedent, laying the ground-work for further trampling of the rights of citizens, and further acts elevating government over the People.
Wrongfully Premised Ruling in Bradley: “[Judicial Immunity] has been the settled doctrine of the English Courts for many centuries and has never been denied, that we are aware of, [Fields didn’t open the books] in the courts of this country. "It has, as Chancellor Kent observes, 'a deep root in the common law.'" Bradley v Fisher, 80 US at 649. It is not true. What was, in fact, happening was that the Commonwealth was developing a more civilized law as they came to recognize the "Unalienable Rights" of man that gave birth to the United States. The major premise of Bradley was factually incorrect when made. English common law had grown to permit judicial liability claims. In Kendillon v Maltby, 174 Eng. Rep. 562, 566 (N.P. 1842) (see the Excerpts), Chief Justice Lord Denman stated the law in l842::
"I have no doubt on my mind, that a magistrate, be he the highest judge in the land, is answerable in damages for slanderous language, either not relevant to the cause before him or uttered after the cause is at an end; but for words uttered in the course of his duty, no magistrate is answerable, either civilly or criminally, unless express malice and the absence of reasonable or probable cause be established."
AMERICAN LAW ON ENGLISH COMMON LAW: "Under the common law of England, where individual rights were preserved by a fundamental document such as the Magna Carta, violations of those rights generally could be remedied by a traditional action for damages; violation of constitutional right was viewed as a trespass, giving rise to a trespass action. WIDGEON V. EASTERN SHORE HOSP. CENTER, 479 a.2d. 921 "
What BRADLEY Got Right: “Judicial immunity is no defense to a judge acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction." BRADLEY V. FISHER, U.S. 13 Wall. 335 (1871) The Judges acted outside of their jurisdiction in KNIZE and can be sued for damages involving questions arising under the Connecticut or United States Constitutions. (Eleventh Amendment) Title 18 U.S.C., Section 241, 242, 18 US Code Sec. 2511 (d)(20), 18 U.S.C 371, 42 U.S.C 126 SUBCHAPTER IV > § 12202, Title 42,CHAPTER 136 , SUBCHAPTER IX,PART B, Sec. 14141, 18 US Code Sec. 2511 (d)(20) and under violations outlined in 18 U.S.C 371, 42 USC 1983 and 1985, Title 28, U.S.C., § 1655,U.S.C § 1001, 42 USC 1987, RICO 18 USC 1961/1962 (c) (d), section 1344 , section 1503, section 1957 and other laws cited in this Complaint.
Judicial Immunity is an abuse and usurpation - against the American Philosophy:
“...and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.-- Declaration of Independence
I demand that the Federal Court form a ruling in such a way, and on behalf of the public interest, which protects with new Guards for future security for the people of the United States “to throw off” judicial Immunity, lest, by failure to do so will incite rightful public recourse against a government become “foreign” to our Constitution, and will prove the Judiciary in disrepute of the administration of justice and to hold no integrity whatsoever.
“Today, the American Bar Association, along with our Judges have craftily constructed our so called Justice system to deny us the protection of our Rights. There can be no limitation on the power of the people of the United States. By their authority the State Constitutions were made, and by their authority the Constitution of the United States was established” - U. S. Supreme Court - Hauenstein vs Lynham (100 US 483)
"I would rather be exposed to the inconveniences attending too much liberty than to those attending too small a degree of it.” Thomas Jefferson
“We hold these truths to be self-evident: That all men [which includes judges] are created equal; that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights; that, among these, are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; and, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it....Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed.”
These words from the Declaration of Independence are instructive that judges are to be placed equally among men for their injustices; because not only whenever any form of government, but whenever any government official becomes destructive of the founding purposes, that official or those officials must be held accountable. Judges argue that America cannot endure a judiciary that is subject to political pressures. Their constant refrain is “Independence” and “Freedom from retaliation” What they really want is, “Independence from accountability” and “Freedom to retaliate.” We cannot allow the judiciary to spin accountability as “political pressure.” Ultimately, it is the people who need protection from bad judges, not the other way around. Read sections 1 and 2 of Article III of the U.S. Constitution very carefully. Congress is authorized to make rules for the Supreme Court and create (and by implication, dissolve) the lower courts.
Section 1: The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour ...
Section 2, Clause 2: In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.
In 1996 Congress added a phrase to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” [Judge Winslow in KNIZE violated her own decree]
If Congress can make rules for the Supreme Court, then the Supreme Court is not “independent” of Congress. Congress is the master of the courts. The Supreme Court cannot “rule” away the power of Congress and it cannot “rule” away its duty to put the people’s interests ahead of its own. Judges are supposed to be our public servants. If they disobey Congress, Congress has the right and the power to make them answer for it. We the People want our power and relief re-secured and restored. We don’t accept that our public servants “decided” to take it away from us. Congress has formed civil rights laws and they are to be obeyed and enforced by the judiciary. Who dares to argue about that? In Knize declaratory decrees were violated by her and higher courts, yet, declaratory relief was unavailable.
Deriving Their Just Powers From the Consent of the Governed. I allege the judiciary’s self-granted immunities is conduct that has been destructive to the founding purposes of our nation. The second question addressed by the Declaration's third self-evident truth is, how should government operate? The answer: by the consent of the governed. Consent means agreement or choice. Judges and Congress never asked the people. Lawyer-Politicians and influence of Judges forced certain judge-protections through Congress. That places parts of the Judicial Conduct and Discipline Act of 1980, FCIA, and The Judicial Discipline and Removal Reform Act of 1990 as unconstitutional. Conduct that is prejudicial to the expeditious administration of the business of the courts would be most assuredly voted by the people as offenses which can be sued upon for damages if injury was sustained.
The government must, in some way, have our agreement, or else it has no "just powers" over us. Consent has two forms: consent in establishing government and consent in operating government. The first-also called the "social compact "-was well defined in the Massachusetts state constitution of 1780 as an association "by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good." There is no common good in judges giving themselves the right to not have to abide by laws that they themselves have been authorized to enforce upon the nation. They have then created an illegal Nobility. They have then created more immunity than the United States President. They have become evil tyrants, having perversely bended the law in their own favor in the name of justice. After the people join together to form a government, they must give their consent, upon a regular basis, to its operations. KNIZE will allow the necessary input from amicus citizens. The second form of consent arises from the fact that the right to liberty is unalienable. One cannot rightly consent to a government that rules without going back to the people for their ongoing consent. Due Process in court and freedom of speech are means necessary to ensure this second form of consent. Our government must not tread on citizens with its false claim of judicial immunity without going to the people; judges should not change the government that we the people created, for their own “light and transient causes”; to say they are not bound to the same laws applicable to all of us. In re Cudahy, 294 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2002): "nonjudicial conduct by a judge can be `prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts' and thus fall within the purview of [28 USC 351 (a) if a Federal Judge is involved]" at 950 (citing In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 39 F.3d at 378) .This mandate must also apply to lower Judges and all courts of the land.
“[with consistency to] the public’s expectations with the desire for the courts to be responsible to changes in public views of what is competent administration. Institute for Court Management; Court Executive Development Program Phase III Project, May 2006.
If Judges act with BIAS as in the KNIZE CASE when law of the land, particularly Statutes, was clearly ignored to prejudice a law-protected party, he/she is plainly guilty of a mental or physical disability resulting in inability to discharge the duties of office and therefore it must be reviewable.. The JC admits the last two paragraphs in rule 1(e), dealing with complaints alleging bias and those alleging undue delay, are in accord with judicial council decisions. It must follow the same in the District Court. Judges of all courts cannot claim Judicial Independence as a cure-all for all misconduct, lack of jurisdiction, and crimes. The Judicial Council and various Appellate (Appeals) courts have also stated the law provides that a complaint against a Judge or a case may be dismissed if it is directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling and they will not provide relief from a ruling or judgment of a court. By the nature of Void Judgments and breaking the law, judge actions as such should always be reviewable in any proceeding. ANY court must proceed to consider the question at length, about the limits of discretionary power, when to set aside judgments and determine impropriety, obtained at a previous term, AND MUST ALWAYS HOLD that when a court acts without jurisdiction, its judgment was void and reviewable on error, misconduct, and crime. This defendant and fellow amicus citizens claim that the 1(e) mandate or any such interpretations, are
Constitutionally repugnant, and we challenge it by whatever authority allowed the rule, whether it was the Legislature or the Judiciary for all the reasons stated in this count. A proper hearing on the debate is by right of the power of the people through our founding documents to revisit what its government has ruled upon in the people’s absence. We demand oversight and our consent presented by this case. If the charges of the defendant are not addressed because JC dismissal concept Under 28 U.S.C. § 351(a), then it will become a much worse affair for the guilty Judges, I will press for Criminal charges under RICO and other laws. So this court WILL hear the allegations. The power to hear a complaint proceeding on the basis that corrective action has not been taken implies some court power to determine whether the facts alleged are true. See Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal (1993). The boundary of that power--the point at which a chief judge invades the territory reserved for special committees--is unclear. Rule 4(b) addresses that issue by stating that the chief judge may conduct a limited inquiry to determine whether the facts of the complaint are “plainly untrue.” For the necessity of Uniform Law the same must hold true for any higher court. Accountability with overlap into the Legislative and with people’s consent is best OFFICIALLY described in:
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, INTERDEPENDENCE, AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY:
Management Of The Courts From The Judges. Perspective; Institute for Court Management; Court Executive Development Program Phase III Project, May 2006
Pg 11: A review of the separation of powers doctrine and the interbranch conflicts created will enhance the understanding of judicial independence. Separation of powers does not specifically mean creation of a barrier that positively prevents any connection or contact between the branches. Preferably, it finds expression mainly in the existence of a balance among the branches. powers, in theory and in practice that makes possible independence in the context of specific reciprocal supervision.17 Although the judiciary is an independent coequal branch of government, the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers allows some overlap in the exercise of governmental functions.18 This overlap is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of overlapping functions...*
Pg 12: There is always a struggle to maintain a balance between the protections of judges from the pressures generated from the public’s expectations with the desire for the courts to be responsible to changes in public views of what is competent administration.
Pg 13: Judicial independence and accountability are considered two different sides of the same coin, just as the independence of an individual judge and the independence of the court from which the judge presides, and is best described as follows: “The capacity of the judiciary to function independently of control by the executive and legislative branches requires the capacity of individual judges to enjoy a measure of extra institutional independence. It also requires that the judiciary, as a system of courts, function and be perceived to function according to law. This in turn requires that individual judges yield some intra institutional independence The judiciary is not exempt from the requirement of accountability to the people it serves for the proper performance of its duties.” Stephen Burbank, Judicial Independence at the Crossroads p. 16 (Sage 2002).
Pg 14: To guide their actions while performing adjudicative and administrative duties, judges rely upon the American Bar Association.s Model Code Of Judicial Conduct. Each state adopts its own version of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct and these specified rules that provide guidance to judges in the performance of their administrative and adjudicatory responsibilities. For example, Model Canon 300 (C) (1) of the ABA.s Model Code Of Judicial Conduct provides: a judge shall diligently discharge the judge's administrative responsibilities without bias or prejudice, maintain professional competence in judicial administration... END EXCERPTS
Judicial Immunity illegally bypasses the requirement that the judiciary, as a system of courts, function and be perceived to function according to law. It illegally bypasses the requirement that individual judges yield some intra institutional independence, as Judicial immunity must be authorized by the legislative branch of government after it consults with the people in some measure. I present with the pertinent question: "What happens when the constitutional remedy to reform government by the People is blocked by the very government sought to be reformed?" Please refer to the writings of John Locke in his Second Treatise on Government. Government ceases when it ceases to protect the People's rights. People's rights being routinely violated by the power in control is, by definition, not of government, but of a foreign power-- a power foreign to our Constitution that has reduced the People under absolute despotism. Anarchy happens when "there is no longer the administration of justice for the securing of men's rights, nor any remaining power within the community to direct the force, [i.e., no provision by which the People can enforce the Constitution] or provide for the necessities of the public" resulting in the absence of government and the people becoming "a confused multitude, without order or connexion." Anarchy results from the effectual dissolution of government by its failure and refusal to protect the People's rights. The Second Treatise of Civil Government (1690) by John Locke, at Chapter XIX "Of the Dissolution of Government" Sec. 218. John Locke, known as the "Philosopher of Freedom" had the greatest influence on our Declaration of Independence.
" Government, according to John Locke, will lose its right to exercise its power, however, when government abuses its people worse than any imaginable group of marauders that might be operating in the absence of a government.” ” In Lockean theory, if government abuses the exercise of the power given it by the people, the people have a natural right to rebel, as did the people of New England in 1776." The Theory of Government, By Peter Landry
When the Constitution was enacted in 1787, it brought into existence the national government. But there was one stipulation: the national government's powers were limited to those enumerated in the Constitution. If a power was not specifically listed, government officials were not permitted to exercise it. Judicial Immunity was never enumerated.
Attorney Says DiBella Had Faced Indictment
