Francis C. P. Knize emails in:

OPEN LETTTER TO AG BLUMENTHAL READY FOR PRESS‏

From:	Frankknee@aol.com
Sent:	Mon 7/13/09 10:17 PM
To:	[email address snipped]

To: Office of the Attorney General

55 Elm Street

Hartford, Connecticut 06106

Telephone: (860) 808-5318`

Fax: (860) 808-5387

July 10, 2009

Dear Attorney General Richard Blumenthal,

As state citizen and Legal Reporter, I respectfully request your analysis and Opinion concerning the duties of your office, as the subject has remained controversial throughout the several states what the role of AG precisely is. I noted with the Chief Justice Sullivan affair you did not represent Sullivan, but rather state interests against public official misconduct. As a sovereign acting in the public interest for which theoretically you serve, I am presuming the following concerning your duties grounded in well-settled Common and Constitutional Law; and formally request for the record your response whether each (a-d) below presumption and each attribute

stated within is correct:

a) the role of Connecticut’s Office of the Attorney General in defending suits for or against government is not a bar to his/her prosecution of court actions to challenge government encroachments on the rights of state citizens and their rights to statutory protections of both Connecticut and the several states as they shall mandate, and exist no bar as well, to challenge unconstitutional state law. The state becomes an “interested party” for any abuses upon the Connecticut Constitution;

b) the Connecticut Attorney General may properly position himself and thus have standing simultaneously on both sides of a suit to invalidate state law: being the proper legal voice for the respondent state government and yet have powers to present to a court forum that certain law is unconstitutional to citizens. He has a duty under those conditions to ask the court to rule for a petitioner citizen, in part under the “likely to be repeated” public interest rule, and has powers to challenge vague laws on behalf of the Sovereign, “We The People” to whom the Connecticut Attorney General owes full allegiance beyond the mandates of CGS Sec. 3-125, and to reinforce Sec. 3-125 in its underlying Constitutional directives, concerning the following clauses:

The Attorney General shall have general supervision over all legal matters in which the state is an interested party. …in all suits and other civil proceedings

(The exception is criminal Cases when prosecutors have been granted the role. However, in a civil capacity, the state becomes an “interested party” with AG jurisdiction for any abuses upon the Conneticut Constitution, with attention to proclaimations reiterated from the U.S. Constitution.)

He shall, when required by either house of the General Assembly or when requested by the president pro tempore of the Senate, the speaker of the House of Representatives, or the majority leader or the minority leader of the Senate or House of Representatives, give his opinion upon questions of law submitted to him by either of said houses or any of said leaders.;

c) Attorney General's have a Parens Patriae Duty To The People. The attorney general has a common law duty to represent the public interest. Constitutional Law and the common law holds high the obligation for the Connecticut Attorney General to act on behalf of state citizens to protect persons, papers, and property and the 14^th Amendment. As an elected official, the people presume and count on the AG to do everything possible to dislodge, through litigation if need be, government encroachments on the rights of the people of this state, including encroachments through unconstitutional law;

d) the Connecticut Attorney General's responsibilities as the legal voice for the government of Connecticut pursuant CGS Sec. 3-125 is secondary to AG obligations to defend the Constitutional and other rights of Connecticut citizens. The Connecticut Constitution fully embraces the principles of the Federal Constitution and the Bill Of Rights therein. That mere fact, Ab Initio, allows the voice of the AG to be empowered by Constitutional dictates.

AUTHORITIES AND CITINGS SUPPORTING THESE CONCLUSIONS

State AG May Seek To Overturn State Law, And Even Constitutional Law.
California Attorney General, Jerry Brown, petitions California Supreme Court to overturn a constitutional amendment on the basis that it allegedly violates inalienable and fundamental rights of state citizens. See LINK http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/California-Supreme-Court-to-Reveal-Prop-8-Decision-Tuesday.html?corder=reverse

A State AG May Petition A Court On Behalf of The People, Against Government, While Simutaneously Representing Government In The Same Suit
Jerry Brown represents the government respondents in the same case. See http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S168047.PDF

Above Legal Principle of Dual Representation By AG Office Is Well Settled
In the above-cited case (with Jerry Brown's participation) the California Supreme Court makes no issue of the dual representation. Even such preeminent constitutional scholars as Professors Vikram David Amar and Alan Brownstein of the University of California, Davis, School of Law make no issue out of it in their article about the suit, The California Attorney General’s Brief in the California Supreme Court Case Challenging Proposition 8: The Questions It Raised, and Why It Surprised Many Observers. See http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/amar/20090102.html

Attorneys General May Sue Governors and Other State Officials On Behalf Of People
Unlike many believe, and some stated in this forum, attorneys general are not appendages of government, "just lawyers for government," but are independent enforcers of law, including constitutional law, and have no allegiance to government itself. They can and must sue government officials violating citizens' rights and committing other transgressions of law. See, e.g. a state attorney general suing the state's governor: http://chronicle.com/daily/2007/09/2007091402n.htm Kentucky's Attorney General Sues Over Governor's Appointments to University Boards Two of Kentucky's top elected officials are heading to court to resolve a dispute over the partisan makeup of the governing boards of the state's public universities.

Attorney Generals Owe Service and Allegiance To The People through the Common Law. It is a settled principle that the elected officials owe allegiance only to the electorate. Whatever other obligations they may have to government agencies/officials, such obligations exist only in the context of agencies'/officials' own service to the people. Where, as in Connecticut (and most states), AGs are elected, they report to the sovereign, the people. This is, among other law, pursuant to common law, which is integrated into our constitutional framework. “The Attorney-General, at common law, was the chief legal representative of the sovereign in the courts, and it was his duty to appear for and prosecute in behalf of the crown any matters, criminal as well as civil . . . . [T]he Attorney-General became the representative of the people of the State, and was the only officer who, by virtue of his common-law powers, could represent the people.” People v. Kramer, 33 Misc. 209, 213-14, 68 N.Y.S. 383, 386 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1900)," Jay L. Himes, Chief, Antitrust Bureau Office of the New York Attorney General, State Parens Patriae Authority: The Evolution of the State Attorney General’s Authority (2004), http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-state/pdf/publications/other-pubs/parens.pdf .

Synopsis: When the Connecticut founders put in the state constitution the provision for Attorney General, they neither defined it nor elaborated on it, because to them the AG concept and functions were already reflected in the Colonial (and British) AGs of the King, who owed allegiance only to the King and who were litigating on behalf of his interests. American AG's had no allegiance to the colonial governors and were at times in adversarial relationships with them. Since the founders could not be clearer on the people being the Sovereign in the Confederate states and subsequently the several states of the Union, the AG's allegiance, duty, service, and representation in legal matters had to shift to the new legal paradigm of owing to the Sovereign of the People rather than to the authorities of the Kings and Queens of Europe.

Attorney General's Parens Patriae Duty To The People
The AGs also have the historical parens patriae duty to defend those who can't defend themselves, which today is the very young, old, dysfunctional people, to those who could not defend their important rights for other reasons, including the lack of resources. See, e.g. the following wording in the above article: "People v. Town of Wallkill, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13364, at *19-20 (S.D.N.Y. March 16, 2001) (upholding attorney general’s parens patriae authority where legal standards and practical difficulties made it unlikely that individual victims of police misconduct could secure the sort of systemic, prophylactic injunctive relief sought)."

Virginia. Under this principle in Virginia it was the VAG's responsibility to challenge HB3202. Left unchallenged by the AG would have allowed terrible unconstitutional law to exist, It’s understandable Virginia is not alone, unconstitutional laws are attempted in the several states all the time -- HB3202 itself was similar to unconstitutional law enacted in a few other states.

Attorneys General Have Wide Discretion In Protecting the Public's Rights and Interests: "People v. Town of Wallkill, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13364, at *19-20, "Absent contrary legislative action, the attorney general “typically may exercise all such authority as the public interest requires. And the attorney general has wide discretion in making the determination as to the public interest." and " Secretary of Administration and Finance v. Attorney General, 367 Mass. 154, 163, 326 N.E.2d 334, 338 (1975) (the attorney general “has a common law duty to represent the public interest”)."

Please set forth your humble opinion in these matters of your duty. I would appreciate if you could expedite your answer and deliver it in a few weeks.

Sincerely,

Francis Knize

50 Sunset Pass

Wilton, Ct 06897

203 544 9603

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This blogger's email address:
stevengerickson@yahoo.com

Link sent in by email

The panel chose not to discipline Judge Alex Kozinski beyond the admonishment.

Judge Kozinski admonished for explicit items on Web site

updated 8:41 p.m. EDT, Thu July 2, 2009

By Bill Mears
CNN

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- A judicial council on Thursday admonished the chief judge of the nation's largest federal appeals court for having "sexually explicit photos and videos" on his personal Web site, but decided against any further punishment.

Judge Alex Kozinski, 58, of the San Francisco, California-based 9th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals previously apologized and had recommended an investigation because of the public controversy over the material.

A panel of judges assigned to investigate concluded Kozinski's "possession of sexually explicit offensive material combined with his carelessness in failing to safeguard his sphere of privacy was judicially imprudent." His actions, the panel wrote, "can reasonably be seen as having resulted in embarrassment to the institution of the federal judiciary."

But Kozinski was not disciplined because he had removed himself from an ongoing obscenity trial when news broke of the visual material on alex.kozinski.com, which the judge launched in 2002, according to the 41-page opinion issued by the judicial council.

According to the council's written opinion, the material included a photograph of naked women painted like dairy cows, a woman shaving her pubic hair, and a video of a half-dressed man "cavorting with a sexually aroused farm animal."

Kozinski testified to a judicial conduct panel that much of the material was "like odd things that I've thrown into a room without looking at them." He said some of the files were e-mailed by friends, much of which he did not bother to view.

He admitted storing some of the sexually explicit photos, but said, "I don't know why I kept them."

The judge also said he never considered his site public and thought he had blocked access to the subcategory file in question, which was labeled "stuff."

There was no immediate reaction from Kozinski or his lawyer to the panel's admonishment.

Kozinski had earlier apologized to the investigative panel for his "unfortunate carelessness."

"I have caused embarrassment to the federal judiciary," he said. "And thus whatever shame was cast on me personally, it reflected on my colleagues and our system of justice as well."

The controversy erupted when Kozinski was about to serve as a trial judge -- separate from his work on the higher appeal court -- in a 2008 obscenity prosecution of adult film producer Ira Isaacs. Kozinski recused himself when the Los Angeles TImes published a story about the Web site material, and he later asked for a probe into the incident.

The Isaacs case has not gone to trial, but is on appeal over pending motions at the 9th Circuit. Kozinski is not expected to take part in the matter.

Kozinski is one of the most colorful and outspoken members of the federal bench. Born in Communist Romania, he emigrated to the United States at age 12 and still speaks with an Eastern European accent. His parents were Holocaust survivors.

He was named to his current seat in 1985 by President Reagan, and he was the youngest federal appeals judge in the nation at the time.

A mainstream Jewish conservative with libertarian views on free speech, the judge is admired for his writing skills, intellectual curiosity and sense of humor. He is also one of the few federal judges who will do press interviews, speaking with CNN on several occasions about a variety of topics. He also wrote an online "diary" for Slate.com a few years ago.

He is especially outspoken in oral arguments on his appeals court, and his detractors say he tends to dominate the questioning, often to the dismay of his fellow judges.

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The below photos, [found here]

Judge Kozinski's "Naked Women Painted as Cows"

Justice Alex Kozinski

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This Story, as posted, on a "Hater's blog":

The PC Apostate II

Just another WordPress.com weblog

---

« Barack Obama will be America’s first "Bastard President."

Here’s Proof. Movies Are Made for Cultural Propaganda, Not Capitalist Profit »

Jew Judge, Alex Kozinski, caught red handed, involving himself in a fellow Jew and pornographers legal case

By speakoutrightnow

Jews should not be allowed to participate in any way with American jurisprudence, every year at Yom Kippur they utter the Kol Nidre prayer which absolves them of any oaths they make in the coming year. In other words, Jews cannot be trusted to tell the truth ever, and that they’re probably lying when they testify against another person. In this case, the Jew judge, Alex Kozinski, will almost certainly conduct this case in such a way as to let off the defendant, a filthy Jew pornographer named Ira Isaacs, who produces pornographic films depicting humans engaged in beastiality. Isaacs ought to be lined up against a wall and shot, not released back into society after a well choregraphed charade of a court case, where no doubt the Jewish judge intended to act in concert with the Jewish media in an effort to politicize the case in some way that would make Ira Isaac’s look like a modern day champion of freedom of speech. Fucking Jews!

9th Circuit’s chief judge posted sexually explicit matter on his website

Judge Alex Kozinski [JEW], now chief of the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, during a 2003 hearing in San Francisco. [Look at this Jew judge, he looks like the very personification of a filthy, anti-Christian, anti-White Yid.]

Alex Kozinski, who is presiding over an obscenity trial in L.A., acknowledges that he had posted sexually explicit photos and videos. He says he didn’t think the public could access the site.

By Scott Glover, Los Angeles Times Staff Writer
10:28 AM PDT, June 11, 2008

One of the highest-ranking federal judges in the United States, who is currently presiding over an obscenity trial in Los Angeles, has maintained his own publicly accessible website featuring sexually explicit photos and videos.

Alex Kozinski, chief judge of the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, acknowledged in an interview with The Times that he had posted the materials, which included a photo of naked women on all fours painted to look like cows and a video of a half-dressed man cavorting with a sexually aroused farm animal. Some of the material was inappropriate, he conceded, although he defended other sexually explicit content as “funny.” [I wonder how funny he'd think it was if he were shot in his Jew head after being convicted of treason and having all of his property confiscated and his family turned out into the streets?]

Kozinski, 57, said that he thought the site was for his private storage and that he was not aware the images could be seen by the public, although he also said he had shared some material on the site with friends. After the interview Tuesday evening, he blocked public access to the site.

Asked whether the contents of his site should force him to step aside from the pending obscenity trial, Kozinski declined to comment. Opening statements in the trial are scheduled for this morning. In the case, Ira Isaacs, a filmmaker based in Los Angeles, is accused of distributing criminally obscene sexual-fetish videos depicting bestiality and defecation.

Stephen Gillers, a New York University law professor who specializes in legal ethics, told The Times that Kozinski should recuse himself from the Isaacs case because “the public can reasonably question his objectivity” concerning the issues at hand.

Gillers, who has known Kozinski for years and called him “a treasure of the federal judiciary,” said he took the judge at his word that he did not know the site was publicly available. But he said Kozinski was “seriously negligent” in allowing it to be discovered.

“The phrase ’sober as a judge’ resonates with the American public,” Gillers said. “We don’t want them to reveal their private selves publicly. This is going to upset a lot of people.”

Gillers said the disclosure would be humiliating for Kozinski and would “harm his reputation in many quarters,” but that the controversy should die there.

He added, however, that if the public concludes the website was intended for the sharing of pornographic material, “that’s a transgression of another order.”

“It would be very hard for him to come back from that,” he said.

Kozinski said he would delete some material from his site, including the photo depicting women as cows, which he said was “degrading . . . and just gross.” He also said he planned to get rid of a graphic step-by-step pictorial in which a woman is seen shaving her pubic hair.

Kozinski said he must have accidentally uploaded those images to his server while intending to upload something else. “I would not keep those files intentionally,” he said. The judge pointed out that he never used appeals court computers to maintain the site.

The sexually explicit material on Kozinski’s site earlier this week was extensive, including images of masturbation, public sex and contortionist sex. There was a slide show striptease featuring a transsexual, and a folder that contained a series of photos of women’s crotches as seen through snug fitting clothing or underwear. There were also themes of defecation and urination, though they are not presented in a sexual context. [Remember, the Jew defendant sitting before him on this case produces this shit - obviously this judge should have taken himself off the case, but the whole point was to get a "friendly" Jewish judge on the case anyway, in order to subvert the legal case against Ira Isaacs.]

Kozinski, who was named chief judge of the 9th Circuit last year, is considered a judicial conservative on most issues. He was appointed to the federal bench by then-President Ronald Reagan in 1985. He has a national reputation for a brilliant legal mind and has developed a reputation as a champion of the First Amendment right to freedom of speech and expression. Several year ago, for example, after learning that appeals court administrators had placed filters on computers that denied access to pornography and other materials, Kozinski led a successful effort to have the filters removed.

The judge said it was strictly by chance that he wound up presiding over the Issacs trial in U.S. District Court in Los Angeles. [Lying goddamn Jew!] Appeals court judges occasionally hear criminal cases when they have free time on their calendars and the Isaacs case was one of two he was given, the judge said. [I'll bet anyone $50.00 that whoever it was that "assigned" the Jew judge the Isaac's case was also a Jew. Any takers?]

Kozinski said he didn’t think any of the material he posted on his website would qualify as obscene.

“Is it prurient? I don’t know what to tell you,” he said. “I think it’s odd and interesting. It’s part of life.”

Before the site was taken down, visitors to http://alex.kozinski.com were greeted with the message: “Ain’t nothin’ here. Y’all best be movin’ on, compadre.”

Only those who knew to type in the name of a subdirectory could see the content on the site, which also included some of Kozinski’s essays and legal writings as well as music files and personal photos.

The judge said he began saving the sexually explicit materials and other items of interest years ago.

“People send me stuff like this all the time,” he said.

He keeps the things he finds interesting or funny with the thought that he might later pass them on to friends, he said.

scott.glover@latimes.com

Times staff writers Ben Welsh and Eric Ulken contributed to this report.

Source - LA Times

This entry was posted on June 12, 2008 at 4:11 am and is filed under Uncategorized. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.

1. Ira Isaacs Says:
   October 22, 2008 at 3:21 pm

   Even if I am found guilty of the bestiality, the scat could be seen as “shock art” then I shall just flee to Israel, while more jewish shit remains constitutionally protected. Fuck you goy boy!

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Excerpt:

In fact, his most vocal comments were directed against his libertarian allies. He even endorsed the Supreme Court's ruling in Kelo v. New London, dismissing the popular outrage at a local government's attempts to take property from middle-class homeowners and hand it to rich developers. "Who was that man," one justice of the Michigan Supreme Court asked after his dinner comments, "and what has he done with Alex Kozinski?"

During Kozinski's visit he sat down with Shikha Dalmia, a senior analyst with the Reason Foundation, who asked about all those issues and more.

reason: What are your primary memories of growing up in Romania?

Alex Kozinski: That they threw rocks at me on the way to the synagogue for Sunday school. They also threw rocks at my father on the way to his synagogue. The Russians threw rocks at my grandfather on the way to his synagogue. So that's the connection, in a sense, between Romanian and Russian Jews.

reason: What about the statism in Romania? How did you react to that?

The above [found here]

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A video by Steven G. Erickson and Francis C. P. Knize on the subject of Eminent Domain:


"In the Interest of Justice", A Documentary Primer


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Judicial Branch insiders tell us what is really going on [here]

A post on how the courts and lawyers rip off your inheritance and put the elderly in mental hospitals and prisons to cover their official crimes. [here]

http://thegetjusticecoalition.blogspot.com/


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This blogger's email: stevengerickson@yahoo.com

This blogger's [main blog]

Should State Police have jurisdiction for outside "Free Speech" violations?

[story]

International Spin Doctors/Lawyers?

I recently posted on an international scandal involving millions of dollars, lawyers, and Big Pharma [click here].

I posted the story this morning and not long after I noticed a hit from:
http://clsdc.com/, their website logo:

Chlopak Leonard Schechter and Associates

When we are talking about big money and big corporate, international interests, their minions are busy 24/7 trolling the internet doing word searches.

I posted something derogatory on the GEICO automobile insurance company [here] and within minutes I could tell that The Government Employees Insurance Company was passing my blog post among themselves in Washington, DC, and to other locations.

So, if you post something about a lone police officer, or especially, the rich and powerful, don't wonder, just know, trolls, investigators, and high paid lawyers are out working double time to shut you up, shut you down, ruin your reputation, shut you up, ruin you financially, and make you think first before opening your "Big Mouth".

[click FOR this post] for more of what I am talking about from a personal experience:

The Connecticut State Trooper Gene Pool?

[click here] for the New York State Police Internal Affairs 168 page official report on Connecticut State Police misconduct [more of the above]

Attacking the "immunity" issue

Should prosecutors be immune from civil and criminal prosecution regarding their official behavior? That subject [discussed here].

Should judges be granted blanket immunity even for bad, malicious, and illegal behavior? Should police, attorney, prosecutiorial, judicial, and official misconduct be the rule, rather than the exception, as it is so obvious in the state of Connecticut and other like states?

The Connecticut [example]

Connecticut, The lack of a Constitution State

For those of you who have not suffered judicial abuse firsthand, or know about how really corrupt all 3 branches of Connecticut government are, I'd be wasting my time trying to inform you. It is so beyond ridiculous, it defies belief.

I was sent the below by email. If you know the story, and can read between the lines, you wonder why these bums are being paid tax dollars and have remained outside of jail cells.

Judges and power brokers make up rules as they go along, they have a long history of this in Connecticut. These "important" people, the ruling class, with a pretend Court System, as part of the Judicial Branch, rule a State like a Monarchy, and there is a class system. There is separate and unequal justice. Injustice is the rule, not the exception. A lot is hidden between statute language and "lawyer-speak". Those of us who have been following the judicial abuse in Connecticut can cite example after example. Police, attorney, prosecutorial, judicial, and official misconduct should not be so prevalent in any state, especially a state that calls itself, "The Constitution State, Connecticut".

"Do as I say, not as I do"

-Steven G. Erickson
stevengerickson@yahoo.com

This came in by email:

Separation of Power discussion Judiciary Hearings

REP. LAWLOR: And in the rules promulgation process, the process you've been in charge of for some time at the juddicial branch, has this come up at all? Have there been rules suggested or adopted that, you know, with victim notification or victim participation or access to information?

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: Not that I'm aware of. I don't recall any proposals being made with -- with regard to adding it as an element of canvass or something like that. That might be a potential, worth of investigation.

REP. LAWLOR: Thank you, your Honor. And congratulations once again.

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: Thank you.

SENATOR McDONALD: Your Honor, I just had a couple of questions to follow up on something that Representative Lawlor started to talk about.

As you know, over the last couple of years this committee, in particular, at the General Assembly, in general, has been looking at the separation of powers issues associated with the promulgation of rules and court procedures. It's been a difficult and mettlesome problem, but I certainly appreciate your efforts over the last couple of years to try to craft solutions, if you will. But picking up on Representative Lawlor's comment that you are a constitutional scholar and Chairman of the Rules Committee, is it your understanding that the Supreme Court has always had exclusive jurisdiction to promulgate its rules of procedure?

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: It -- it's a -- it depends what you use as the -- the measuring stick.

Prior to 1818, there was a statute passed by the Legislature that delegated the rulemaking authority to the -- the judges of the Superior Court sitting as a Supreme Court, I think is the language of the 1807 statute. That was kind of interesting because they were one and the same at that point. All of the superior court judges were -- sat at the Supreme Court at that point.

That remained unchanged, as I -- nearly as I can tell until 1818, when the Constitution was -- was adopted and the separation of powers was implemented for the first time in a document in Connecticut.

I don't know how much history you want here, but you asked whether or not the -- the Supreme Court has always maintained control over it. There are a number of statutes throughout the 18 -- 1800s that took the rulemaking authority from the Supreme Court, gave it to the Superior Court. I think it went back to the Supreme Court for a while and eventually it ended up in the -- the rulemaking authority ended up, by statute, in any event, with the judges of the Superior Court, the present system that we have now.

So if you're measuring stick is what the statute said, then it has been back and forth between the Supreme Court and the Superior Court.

SENATOR McDONALD: And the statute that you're referencing that's known as 51-14, which talks about the delegation by the Legislature to the judicial branch or to the judges of the Superior Court to promulgate rules.

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: Correct.

SENATOR McDONALD: Right?

Now in the statute it talks about all statutes relating to pleadings, practice and procedure in existence on July 1st of 1957 shall be deemed to be rules of court and shall remain, in effect, as such until modified, superseded, to the extent -- that type of thing.

Does the Rules Committee separately track the rules that were promulgated prior to 1957?

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: Every year, I think there's another statute that goes along with that that requires the chief justice to report to the -- maybe it's in the same statute -- report to the -- either the Judiciary Committee or the Legislature any changes in statutes that are above and beyond those that existed in that year, so -- and I believe that report is done. It's not -- I don't believe the Rules Committee does that. I think the -- I think the chief justice does it.

SENATOR McDONALD: Well, but my question -- my question was do you see any -- well, let me ask a different question.

Do you see any distinction between rules that were promulgated prior to July 1st of 1957 and rules of practice promulgated after that date about who has the authority to do -- to promulgate such rules?

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: I think in -- in State versus DeJesus, which is a case that was recently decided that had to do with rules of evidence, it had nothing to do with -- it didn't have anything directly to do with rules of procedure. There is an analogy made between the rules of procedure or practice and the rules of evidence, saying there's a -- a fairly healthy -- I thought it was healthy -- discussion in that case as to the authority inside the branch itself with respect to the rules of evidence, but brought into that discussion was the -- was the history of the rules of practice.

There is a theory, and I'm not expressing an opinion on this because it hasn't been before us yet, and it may or may not come before us, but there is a theory that if, when the constitution was passed or adopted in 1818, it froze in time whatever existed at that point with respect to the powers of the various branches. And if the statute in 1818, the appropriate delegation by the Legislature to the -- to the courts in 1807 was in effect in 1818 when the Constitution was adopted, then in 1818 that became part of the Constitution. I think that's probably the argument that it doesn't matter what happened after that once it was constitutionalized in 1818.

SENATOR McDONALD: Okay. So let me get back to my -- one of my prior questions. Does the Rules Committee that you chair, separately track rules of practice that were promulgated before July 1st of 1957?

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: The Rules Committee itself does not. The -- the -- the Office of Counsel that offers services to the Rules Committee I believe does that for the chief justice.

SENATOR McDONALD: And in your experience, has any rule of practice or procedure that was promulgated before July 1st of 1957, ever been modified, extended or superseded?

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: I'm sure they have.

SENATOR McDONALD: And you as the --

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: Numerous times.

SENATOR McDONALD: My point is --

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: Oh, I get -- I understand.

SENATOR McDONALD: You got my point. Okay.

Has the Legislature been notified of that?

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: I believe they have.

SENATOR McDONALD: Beforehand?

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: No -- beforehand?

SENATOR McDONALD: Yes.

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: I doubt it was beforehand. I suspect that that notification probably goes out after the Rules Committee completes it -- its work and the judges in the Superior Court have adopted the rule.

SENATOR McDONALD: And how can that be done consistent with 51-14? How can a rule that was declared by statute to be a rule be superseded without the acquiescence of the General Assembly?

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: It would -- if the power resides in the juddicial branch constitutionally to create and -- and modify its own rules, that's the power.

SENATOR McDONALD: Okay.

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: Constitutional.

SENATOR McDONALD: And ultimately -- I mean, the challenge for us institutionally is that, under that paradigm, the juddicial branch is the only one having a discussion about who has the authority to adopt or modify rules that, at least going back into the fifties, appear to have been done by statute?

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: I would suggest that it's been done even prior to 1957 by the Legislature and by statute. The statutes didn't begin in 1957 with this -- in this regard. They date all the way back -- you'll find one of them in the 1850's. I think you'll find another one in the 1830's.

SENATOR McDONALD: Right.

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: And it's a product, in my view, of the history of the development of the independent judiciary in this state.

In 1818, the Legislature -- and with all due respect, I know you're all Legislators and -- did not recognize fully the independence of the branch, the judicial branch. In fact, they, I believe, continued to do divorces in the -- in the Legislature. And it was only -- and the branch was unwilling in the early days of the supposed independence of challenging the Legislature in the 18 -- early 1800's. It was only until the Norwalk Railroad case that really established the independence of the branch, and that was in the late 1800's that they -- they established the independence of -- of the -- of the branch.

SENATOR McDONALD: Okay.

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: So these statutes were passed as a matter of course.

SENATOR McDONALD: All right. You know, we are at -- I know other members of the committee want to ask questions. I have a couple of other ones, but I actually want to ask you -- we're going to have an opportunity to be revisiting this subject later on in the session -- would you be willing to come back and help us work through some of these issues when we have that opportunity?

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: Certainly.

SENATOR McDONALD: I appreciate that.

I did want to go back to the DeJesus case, however, because that decision is largely unnoticed in the public, but I think it's a very important decision. And the question I have for you is, if the rules of evidence codify existing statutes and the common law on the rules of evidence -- right? Do we agree that the rules of evidence codify existing statutes and common law?

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: Absolutely.

SENATOR McDONALD: Okay. So if the rules of evidence are the codification of statutory and common law, how is the Supreme Court authorized to supplant the rules of evidence if it deems it appropriate in any particular case?

And that's what I understood the DeJesus decision to allow the Supreme Court to do, and if I'm wrong, please correct me.

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: The DeJesus case was a question of whether or not the ultimate authority with respect to the code of evidence lies with the Superior Court judges or the Supreme Court. It was an interbranch dispute, had not -- not -- literally, nothing to do with the Legislature.

The question was, if the Superior Court judges promulgated a code of evidence, was that code binding on the Supreme Court? Obviously, if there -- there is a recog -- has been a recognition in this state that there is a joint function in creating the rules of evidence, you have the right to pass statutes with respect to evidence, we have the common law of evidence that we develop. This had nothing to do with whether or not the Supreme Court could ignore or overrule a statute. This had to do with the power of the Superior Court judges to bind the Supreme Court judges.

SENATOR McDONALD: But -- and I understand that. But the Superior Court judges codified -- in adopting the rules of evidence, it codified within the code statutory evidentiary standards.

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: Right.

SENATOR McDONALD: So is there a carve-out in the DeJesus case to say that the Supreme Court can only overrule rules of evidence that were promulgated under the code of evidence under the common law and not under statute?

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: The -- the -- no. There wasn't a carve-out, and I don't believe that it was necessary to carve anything out, because the dispute in, and as I said, in DeJesus, revolved around the distribution of power inside the judicial branch. Nobody was suggesting that the Supreme Court, by common law, could ignore or overrule a statute.

SENATOR McDONALD: So what would happen if the Legislature codified the code of evidence into statute; would that be binding on the Supreme Court?

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: It's a -- that's a -- it's a difficult question. I think certainly -- it's a difficult question. I suspect you probably could.

SENATOR McDONALD: And --

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: And, in fact, I think the reason you didn't and specifically asked the -- the -- the judicial branch to do it was because when -- whenever you try and codify a major piece of work like the rules of evidence, you're going to have everybody sort of picking at their pet, you know, their pet peeves, and I guess that was the reason why it was asked that the code originally be codified and adopted by the -- by the judicial branch.

SENATOR McDONALD: Right. And -- but, see, the problem -- the problem I have is I under -- that predates my tenure here in the Legislature.

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: Right.

SENATOR McDONALD: The problem I have with that is, if something like that is done as a matter of convenience, a generation later it takes on added significance that it was somehow ceding power from one branch of government to another. And your branch of government is concerned with that type of thing; our branch of government is concerned with that type of thing. I'm just trying to figure out where that appropriate balance is because -- well, let me ask you the question.

Why should the judges of the Superior Court participate in an annual review of the rules of evidence if it doesn't appear to have any binding authority on the branch itself?

Does that not -- I understand we have a -- that there's an intellectual and constitutional issue at stake, but I'm trying to figure out why would judges waste their time in participating in that process if it didn't have any real-world consequences.

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: Well, if you take -- if you look at the code as a codification of existing law on a date its published, it's a very useful and -- and -- it's useful to attorneys. It's useful to judges. It's a very useful document.

Whether or not the judges of the Superior Court ought to be adopting it as a binding --

SENATOR McDONALD: Your Honor, could I interrupt you.

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: Sure.

SENATOR McDONALD: This is now the second time that the testimony has been interrupted by cell phones. Would everybody please take a moment to turn their cell phones off or turn them on to a silent mode so that we can give our full attention to Justice Zarella.

I apologize for interrupting, your Honor.

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: Unfortunately, and I agree with you, that sometimes things are done for one reason, but over the course of time that reason gets lost. My understanding of how the -- the code of evidence was originally delegated to the -- to the judicial branch was that there was --

SENATOR McDONALD: Not delegated.

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: Well -- I'm sorry. Ended up being done by the -- the judicial branch, was there was a joint committee of the Legislature and the judicial branch. And that committee, working together, codified -- they came up with the proposed codification of the rules of evidence, taking into account all of the case law and all of the statutes, incorporated it into this one document. I think it was 1999 this happened. It was then presented to this committee, it's my understanding, and after some thought it was decided -- and I was not part of it -- it was decided that it might be better if the judges -- if the judicial branch adopted it.

I think Justice Callahan was -- was the chief justice at the time, and a decision was made that, if there's a -- we have a rules committee who created a code of evidence committee inside the judicial branch, don't make a recommendation of -- on evidence rules to the rules committee, which will then pass it on to the judges of the Superior Court. I think that was chosen because it was the only method that was available, at that particular point in time, inside the branch itself for the adoption of any kind of rules.

SENATOR McDONALD: And one final question.

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: And I don't know what the support for that is. I don't know what the authority to do that is.

SENATOR McDONALD: One final question and then I'll shut up. The -- if the rules of evidence are not binding on the Supreme Court, given their constitutional role, right, how can they be binding on individual judges of the Superior Court who are also discharging their constitutional obligations?

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: Again, if -- if there is a separate source of authority such as a statute, it's binding on all of them. If it's common law that's where we --

(Gap in tape.)

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: -- have common law authority as well. If there's an area where no decision has ever been made on a particular evidentiary question, they're creating the common law.

If that is appealed to the Supreme Court, that becomes the ultimate common law authority.

SENATOR McDONALD: Understood. But it --

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: So if -- I'm sorry.

SENATOR McDONALD: No. Well, I mean, you know, any creative lawyer can find a nuance in any rule of evidence, and my concern is if that -- if that nuance is created, does that create an opening for a Superior Court judge to create a new rule of common law in spite of the code of evidence if they can crack the door open a little bit?

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: They -- they may. I mean, and there's nothing wrong with that because it will ultimately be reviewed by the Supreme Court. And either the imprimatur will be put on that or it won't. So I don't see that as a particular problem.

SENATOR McDONALD: Okay. Well, I'll be happy to take the subject up with you later. I appreciate your time. And, obviously, we are always illuminated by your comments, and I congratulate you on your nomination.

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA: Thank you.

SENATOR McDONALD: Senator Kissel.

SENATOR KISSEL: Thank you very much, Chairman McDonald.

Justice Zarella, delighted to see you. Thank you for all

* * * *
* * * *
* * * *

I was terrorized at the Connecticut State Capitol [story]

http://starkravingviking.blogspot.com/

Freedom of Speech Case

The below was sent to me by email:

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MADISON COUNTY, ALABAMA

DORARENA KAY BOSTON, )
n/k/a DORARENA KAY HEISEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )Case No. DR 99-1631.03
)
SCOTT CHRISTOPHER HOBBS, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED

Comes now the Defendant Scott Christopher Hobbs (hereinafter referred to as “Chris”), by and through his attorney of record, and files this Memorandum of Law in Support of his Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted, as follows:

I. THE PLAINTIFF IS ATTEMPTING TO RESTRICT THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO FREE PUBLIC SPEECH

This Court cannot grant the Plaintiff Dora Heisey’s (hereinafter referred to as “Dora”) request without impermissibly violating Chris’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech. The restrictions sought by Dora are unconstitutional. Dora is not attempting to restrict Chris’ speech to their child, per se, but she is attempting to restrict Chris’ speech to the public, because of the effect she thinks Chris’ public speech might have on the child.

A. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the government from interfering with a person’s freedom of speech.

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the government from interfering with a person’s “freedom of speech.” Alabama courts have considered many First Amendment cases, and have been consistently emphatic of the enormous protection afforded one’s right to free speech. The Alabama Appellate Court has affirmed that the First Amendment was fashioned to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people. Ford v. Jefferson County, 904 So.2d 300 (Ala.Civ.App. 2004) (Per Murdock, J., with four Judges concurring in the result)(citations omitted). Further, the law is clear that speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression under the First Amendment; it is the essence of self-government. Id. Accordingly, the Court has frequently reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the ‘ “highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values,” ’ and is entitled to special protection. Id. (Citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980).

In the landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), the United States Supreme Court stated the following with regard to the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech:
“The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions. The constitutional safeguard, we have said, ‘was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.’ Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498. ‘The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.’ Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117. ‘[I]t is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions,’ Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270, 62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192, and this opportunity is to be afforded for ‘vigorous advocacy’ no less than ‘abstract discussion.’ N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405. The First Amendment, said Judge Learned Hand, ‘presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.’ United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.1943)..”

Id. at 270-71, 84 S.Ct. 710.

B. Dora seeks to restrict Chris’ political expression speech aimed at informing the public about his experience in the domestic relations court.

As noted in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-219, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 16 L.Ed2d 484 (1966):
“ ‘Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters relating to political processes.’”

The Alabama Supreme Court considered First Amendment issues regarding statements by a school board member and a mayor that a state senator and other public figures may have violated state ethics laws in Sanders v. Smitherman, 776 So.2d 68 (Ala. 2000). The Supreme Court of Alabama held that such statements were, at their core, political speech concerning matters of public concern and were subject to full measure of protection under First Amendment. The Supreme Court noted that they had to “consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.” Id. at 74 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, supra).
Dora claims in her Petition that Chris has subjected the child to “information concerning court proceedings and [Chris’s] position that he has been treated inequitably and unfairly by the judges of this county.” She makes no complaint in her Petition other than about Chris’ statements about the previous judge in his case. Clearly, such speech on the part of Chris is a “vehement, caustic and ...unpleasantly sharp attack on [a] government and public official” that is protected, and indeed valued, as described by the Alabama Supreme Court in Sanders, supra.

C. A court order restricting political expression is subject to strict scrutiny and Dora must prove a compelling governmental reason to restrict this speech.

It is clear that the speech Dora seeks to restrict is political expression aimed at informing the public about Chris’ experience in the domestic relations court. Because she is seeking a court order restricting political expression that “occupies the core of the protection afforded by the First Amendment,” this Court will apply “the most exacting scrutiny” when analyzing the order’s constitutionality. Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Com’n, 802 So.2d 207 (Ala. 2001); see also Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 102 S. Ct. 153 (1982).
http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?tf=-1&serialnum=1982115443&rs=WLW9.02&ifm=NotSet&fn=_top&sv=Split&tc=-1&findtype=Y&ordoc=2001616596&db=708&vr=2.0&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&mt=FamilyLawPrac When “a State seeks to restrict directly [political expression], the First Amendment surely requires that the restriction be demonstrably supported by not only a legitimate interest, but a compelling one, and that the restriction operate without unnecessarily circumscribing protected expression.” Brown, 456 U.S. at 53-54, 102 S.Ct. 1523. Freedom of speech or press is susceptible to only such restrictions as are necessary to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which state may lawfully protect. Mills, supra.

The law is clear that the First Amendment not only prohibits censorship, but prohibits government conduct that inhibits free and general discussion of public matters. Ex parte Balogun, 516 So.2d 606 (Ala. 1987)(Overruled on other grounds). Further, the protection afforded by the First Amendment does not turn upon the truth, popularity or social value of the ideas and beliefs which are offered. Id. Requirements of the First Amendment are stringent and demanding and any regulatory scheme impinging upon such rights is assured of close scrutiny. General Corp. v. State ex rel. Sweeton, 320 So.2d 668 (Ala. 1975)(Per Almon with three Judges concurring, four Judges concurring in the result and one Judge concurring specially).

Judge Story, in his Work on the Constitution (5th Ed.) vol. 2, pars. 1886-1892, both
inclusive, fully discusses, with cited authority, the clause of the Constitution preserving the freedom of the press and free speech and concludes with this statement: “No one can doubt the importance, in a free government, of a right to canvass the acts of public men and the tendency of public measures, to censure boldly the conduct of rulers, and to scrutinize closely the policy and plans of the government. This is the great security of a free government. If we would preserve it, public opinion must be enlightened; political vigilance must be inculcated...”

According to the Supreme Court of Alabama, Chris’s constitutional liberty of speech implies the right to freely utter and publish whatever Chris may please, and to be protected against responsibility for so doing, except so far as such publications may be publicly offensive to include blasphemy, obscenity, or scandalous character, or may injuriously affect standing, reputation, or pecuniary interests of individuals by their falsehood and malice. Barton v. City of Bessemer, 173 So. 621 27 Ala App. 413 (1936)(Rev’d on other grounds).
D. The subject of Chris’ website is all matters of public record.

The speech which Dora seeks to restrain is the website www.whyjudgelittle.com, and advertisements for the website. The website contains an outline of the pleadings, transcripts, and trial court and appellate rulings in the custody lawsuits waged by Dora against Chris. The substance of the website is simply a recitation and explanation of matters that are public record.

E. Dora has not made any allegations that, even if they were true, would be sufficient enough to violate Chris’ First Amendment rights.

Dora makes no such claim in her Petition that Chris has published anything false, publicly offensive, or obscene. Further, Dora does not offer any compelling governmental interest to justify restricting Chris’s right to political expression. In fact, she does not make any allegation other than Chris’ political speech has caused the child to “be nervous, resistant to exercising visitation, and has subjected him to extreme embarrassment.” While Chris vehemently denies these accusations, even if these allegations were true, they are insufficient to overcome Chris’ First Amendment rights, as the following cases set forth below demonstrate.

The Supreme Court of Alabama recognized, in Doe v. Roe, 638 So.2d 826 (Ala. 1994) that the fact that a subject is already a matter of public record is an important factor when considering whether the court could enjoin a person from publishing those matters of public record in a different forum. In Doe, the adoptive father of children whose mother was murdered by their father sought an injunction against the publishing of a novel based on the murder. The trial court granted the injunction, and the author/publisher appealed. The dispositive question on appeal is whether the injunction violated Article I, § 4, of the Constitution of the State of Alabama. According to Article I, § 4, “no law shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of the press; and any person may speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.”

The adoptive father in Doe contended that the distribution of the novel would intrude upon his children's privacy and that the children would suffer “irreparable mental and emotional injuries” if the novel were published and distributed. The trial court agreed and issued the injunction. The Doe appellate court disagreed and held that the injunction against the publication of the novel violated the author/publisher’s right to free speech.

Another similar case is found in Interest of Summerville, 190 Ill.App.3d 1072, 547
N.E.2d 513 (1989). In Summerville, a child was the subject of a custody dispute and the child’s name and face appeared on a television new report. The trial court then entered an order prohibiting the parties in a child custody case from communicating with the media. The Guardian Ad Litem of the child objected to the order as being violative of the first amendment, overbroad and vague. The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) contended that the order was “reasonable to prevent potential future harm and embarrassment to [the minor child who was the subject of the custody suit]...” The Summerville Court held that a finding of “possibilities,” even if present, was not sufficient to support a conclusion that the order was constitutionally valid. The Summerville Court held that the order prohibiting the parties from communicating with the media in the child custody case did violate the First Amendment rights of the parties, as there was no evidence that the conduct of the parties created a clear and present danger, or serious and imminent threat to the fairness and integrity of the judicial process.

Consider also the case of Meredith v. Meredith, -P.3d-, 2009 WL 387272 (Wash.App.Div 2). In this case, the trial court restrained the husband from “contacting any agency regarding [his wife’s] immigration status...” The husband appealed, arguing this order impermissibly interfered with his right to free speech and his right to petition the government for a redress of grievances. The appellate court agreed, and held that the family court’s order was an unconstitutional prior restraint on the husband’s federal First Amendment rights.

In the case at bar, Dora seeks to restrict Chris’ free speech rights via an order directing Chris not to transport his child in an automobile that has an advertisement for the www.whyjudgelittle.com website. She also seeks to restrict Chris’ free speech rights via an order directing Chris not to pass out handbills or leaflets advertising the website when the child is present. Finally, she seeks to restrict Chris’ free speech rights via an order directing Chris not to have a sign in his front yard that advertises the website.

None of these restrictions would be constitutional. Chris has a constitutional right not only to free public speech about his experience in the domestic relations court, but also to teach his son about his rights, how our form of government operates, and to demonstrate to him to be an active participant in the freedoms and processes granted to the citizens of the United States by the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Alabama without interference by those who dislike the content of Chris’ speech, or Chris’ efforts to educate himself, his son and those in his community. As a result, Chris’ Motion to Dismiss is due to be granted on constitutional grounds.

II. THERE IS NO LAWFUL ORDER OF REASONABLE SPECIFICITY REGARDING CHRIS’ SPEECH FOR WHICH HE MAY BE FOUND IN CONTEMPT OF COURT.

Not only is Chris’ Motion to Dismiss due to be granted on constitutional grounds, but it is also due to be granted because Dora seeks to hold Chris in contempt for an order that cannot in any way be reasonably interpreted to enjoin Chris from speaking out about the previous trial judge or his experience in domestic relations court. In order to find a party in contempt of court for violating an order, the contempt petitioner must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the party to be held in contempt was subject to a lawful order of reasonable specificity, that the party violated that order, and that the party’s violation of the order was wilful. Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 70(A)(a)(2)(C)(ii).

Dora, however, cannot, and does not in her complaint, point to any order that specifically enjoins Chris from making statements of his opinion of the judiciary or the previous judge in this case. Dora cannot, and does not in her complaint, point to any order that specifically
enjoins Chris from using his child’s photograph when making statements of his opinion of the judiciary or the previous judge in this case.
Further, Dora does not make a claim in her Petition that Chris has made disparaging remarks about her in the presence of the child. Nevertheless, Dora asks that this Court find Chris in contempt of court for violating the orders that enjoins each party from making disparaging remarks about the other in the presence of the child.

Finally, Dora does not make a claim in her Petition that Chris has made his child his confidant. Nevertheless, she asks this Court to find Chris in contempt of court for violating the orders that the parents should not make the children confidants of a parent.

Because Dora seeks to hold Chris in contempt for making remarks about the judiciary and for including the child’s picture in flyers regarding his remarks about the judiciary, and because there is nothing in any court prohibiting Chris from doing so, this Court cannot, as a matter of law, find beyond a reasonable doubt that Chris willfully violated a lawful order of reasonable specificity.

The court orders that Dora seeks to hold Chris in contempt for allegedly violating are
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Dora, in effect, asks this Court to interpret the current custody order as an order prohibiting Chris from making statements of his opinion of the judiciary or the previous judge in this case. Such an interpretation is completely without merit, and in fact would result in an unconstitutional result. That is, the court order would be so vague as to leave Chris without knowledge of the nature of speech that is prohibited. Any order restricting speech must include clear guidelines regarding what is illegal so that there will be no “chilling” effect on exercise of free speech. Dowling v. Alabama State Bar, 539 So.2d 149 (Ala. 1988). Clearly, when a court order is issued, the acts or things proscribed should be specified in the order with such reasonable definiteness and certainty that a party bound by the order may readily know what he must refrain from doing without the matter being left to speculation and conjecture.

It would be impossible for the average, reasonable person to conclude that the standard
parenting provisions recited verbatim in paragraph 2 of Dora’s Motion to Hold Defendant in Contempt of Court would enjoin that person from publishing a website speaking out against a trial judge and describing his experience in domestic relations court. It would be impossible for the average reasonable person to conclude that those standard parenting provisions prohibited him from advertising that website at his home or on his vehicle. It would be impossible for the average reasonable person to conclude that he could not publish photographs of his child on his website or on his automobile. This court cannot find, as a matter of law, based upon the pleading before it, beyond a reasonable doubt that Chris was subject to a lawful order of reasonable specificity, that Chris violated that order, and that Chris’s violation of the order was wilful. For these reasons, Chris’ Motion to Dismiss is due to be granted.
This the ____ day of ________________, 2009.
____________________________________
Dinah P. Rhodes
Attorney for the Defendant
115 Manning Drive, Suite D-202
Huntsville, AL 35801
256-536-1676 ‏

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing upon opposing counsel of record, William P. Burgess, by placing a copy of the same in his Courthouse Box on this the_______day of February, 2009.

Asking for Legislative Protection from a Terrorist Police State

Melinda Tuhus File Photo was found on the New Haven Independent [here]
Connecticut State Representative Toni E. Walker, Deputy Majority Leader and Connecticut State Representative. [her webpage]

Text of email I sent to Representative Walker:

To: Representative Walker or to whom it may concern:

I testified in front of you and others on the panel live on CT-N television last night [Feb. 10, 2009].

I wish to inform you that the Connecticut State Police Capitol Guards are up to their same terror tactics. If Connecticut Police Officers, or the members of the Black Robed Mafia, Connecticut Judges, don't like what legislation a citizen proposes, or what a citizen says regarding police and judicial misconduct, that citizen can be a target for being arrested on sight, having their children officially kidnapped by DCF, enduring rigged court proceedings, and even being railroaded to prison.

The best evidence of the Connecticut State Police "Secret Enemies List", is the case of journalist and former Green Party campaign manager for Connecticut Governor, being arrested on sight after having been critical of Governor Rell. [story] Police in Connecticut can even be caught on tape after paying a Connecticut State Registered Confidential Police Informant to kill citizens for having made police misconduct complaints. $10,000 seems to be the going rate for police to pay informants to kill citizens. Are taxpayers funding a Connecticut State Police Death and Goon Squad? [story]

Chris Kennedy and I were both harassed and terrorized by a Capitol Guard or Guards last night when leaving. Each of separately when leaving had a Capitol Guard Connecticut State Police cruiser get right on our tails, almost touching our bumpers, turning their lights on the panel bar, but not the flashing light. The driver of the cruiser who pulled by me, seemed to be trying to block me from backing up, or even obstructing my ability to back up the vehicle I was driving. We were both followed out with a cruiser on our tail almost touching my rear bumper. The officer drove his, or possibly her, cruiser side to side for me to get a view in both mirrors and to see the illuminated lights on top of the cruiser.

That by itself might not be alarming, but both Chris Kennedy and I have lodged misconduct complaints against Connecticut State Police and Judge Jonathan J. Kaplan.

When I wished to speak out at the Stafford Springs, Connecticut, Town Selectman Frazzinelli (sp.?), allegedly installed town officers and Troop C, Connecticut State Police at the doors of town hall to arrest me if I tried to speak at a public forum where members of the public were invited to speak, publicly. I waited for months, had Donald Christmas drive me in, and pick me up, after speaking. Frazzinelli tried to prevent me from speaking and was very rude. Frazzinelli then made the front page of the Manchester Journal Inquirer, the next day for preventing me from speaking at a public meeting.

Why bring up Frazzinelli? Well, whenever I see him at the Capitol, he will stalk me, eyeball me, and alert Capitol Guards to try and stare me down in numbers and follow me around the capitol. I fear arrest anytime I come to the Capitol, just for being there. I have been pulled over walking, and detained. Frazzinelli is allegedly connected with the Department of State in Connecticut. Frazzinelli came in the hearing last night to check out my camera equipment, where I had my cables, and to stare at me, yet again.

Connecticut State Police Colonel Thomas Davoren seems to be the head of the Capitol Guard and is present often. Davoren allegedly saw to it that I was terrorized out of my Connecticut home that I used to own, to lose my great relationship with my National Honor Society daughter, to lose my small business, to be falsely arrested and railroaded to prison in a rigged "trial". [that story]

Toni, please look into my allegations. Please let me know you have read and received this email. Please pass this email onto the rest of the Connecticut Legislative Judiciary Committee. Please look into docket # CR01-0074672 as a committee to investigate the gross attorney, judicial, and police misconduct that is rampant in Connecticut.

A Grand Jury solution to this problem is discussed in [this OpEd News article].

More information about what I am talking about and youtube videos are [posted here]

My contact information given to you upon request.

Thank you,

Steven G. Erickson
stevengerickson@yahoo.com

The Disparity of a State's "Questionable Justice"

WILLIAM Coleman, center, is flanked by attorneys William Murray and Aubrey Ruta at Superior Court in Hartford Thursday. (AP PHOTO/BOB CHILD / January 29, 2009)

Connecticut

Hunger-Striking Inmate Attends Court Hearing

By MARK SPENCER | The Hartford Courant
January 30, 2009

William Coleman, appearing gaunt from his 16-month hunger strike, listened intently in Superior Court in Hartford Thursday as a prison doctor testified that he ordered the inmate force-fed to prevent permanent organ damage, or even death.

Coleman, a native of Liverpool, England, is challenging the Department of Correction's bid to have Judge James T. Graham make permanent a temporary injunction he issued in January of 2008 that allows the state to force-feed the inmate. Coleman was sentenced in 2005 to eight years in prison for raping his wife, a conviction he says was an unjust outcome of a corrupt judicial system.

Coleman, wearing a tie and a white, button-down shirt that looked several sizes too big, waved and smiled to a handful of supporters in court. His sister, who had traveled from England this week, was supposed to have been among them. Instead, Nandy Allen was at Hartford Hospital. She collapsed while visiting her brother Wednesday at the Osborn Correctional Institution in Somers moments after embracing him for the first time in years, family members and friends said.

In court Thursday, Assistant Attorney General Ann Lynch said the prison had an obligation to protect Coleman, who has repeatedly said he is willing to starve himself to death, and a duty to preserve stability in the state prison system.

"Allowing an inmate to die — absent intervention by the state — could have a profoundly detrimental effect on other inmates," Lynch said.

Coleman's attorney, William E. Murray, of Edwards, Angell, Palmer & Dodge, said his client was not using violence or terror to make his point, "but rather the peaceful hunger protest used by Gandhi." The length of the hunger strike illustrates Coleman's commitment, Murray said.

"Most of us cannot imagine going without solid food for 16 hours," Murray said in his opening statement. "Yet, here sits a man who has done so for over 16 months."

Dr. Edward Blanchette, clinical director for the state Department of Correction, described an odyssey that began in September of 2007, when Coleman stopped eating solid food. The inmate's weight dropped steadily during the following months as he sustained himself by drinking water and occasionally milk or juice.

During a time when Coleman was housed in the infirmary at MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution in Suffield, regular prison meals were left in his cell in an effort to break the hunger strike, Blanchette said. Medical staff suspected but weren't certain that he occasionally ate something.

For a time, Coleman's weight stabilized after he agreed to take an energy drink three times a day, but he stopped all liquids in September, the one-year anniversary of his hunger strike.

Blanchette, the only witness to testify Thursday, said Coleman weighed 237 pounds at the beginning of the hunger strike, and was 139 pounds when he ordered the inmate to be restrained and given fluids intravenously in September.

"He told me directly [that] he would pull out the IV if he wasn't restrained," Blanchette said.

Later, Coleman twice was given nutrition via a tube inserted through his nose and into his stomach. He resumed using the nutritional drink after the second tube feeding and now weighs in the mid-150s.

Coleman's ex-wife accused him of rape while they were divorcing and fighting over the custody of their two sons. Coleman says the charge was fabricated and that his sons are being "abused" by being separated from him. Convicted in a jury trial, he has exhausted his appeals, other than a long-shot habeas petition.

Carol Kinsley, a friend of Coleman's who traveled from Rhode Island Thursday to attend the hearing, said she does not want him to die, but hopes the media attention the hunger strike has generated will lead to a re-examination of the case.

"He's stable, he's competent and he's intelligent," Kinsley said. "He has the right not to be force-fed."

Murray said Coleman will testify, likely next week, about what he hopes his hunger strike will accomplish.

David McGuire, an attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union of Connecticut who also is representing Coleman, said the inmate has the right to free speech and to refuse medical treatment.

"It's clear that inmates lose some of their rights when they go into prison, but not all of them," McGuire said.


My comment posted on the Hartford Courant website for this above article:
Maybe the man in this story is not guilty of anything.

Connecticut only seems to have admitted one court "mistake" in over 2 centuries. Tillman, convicted of rape, spending almost 2 decades in prison was released and paid off. He's the exception.

You have police investigators sending racist emails to each other taking pictures of dead minority citizens, putting chicken bones and watermelon seeds in the scene, putting racist captions underneath and emailing each other. You have a Trooper flying a helicopter after making terrorist threats to kill other police officers and destroy aircraft at an airport blowing it up.

You have judicial branch whistleblowers coming forward about bid rigging for court cleaning services, alteration and the destroying of evidence on court hard drives, case rigging, retaliation, nepotism, and the defrauding of taxpayers. The accused abusers in the system, sat on the panel hearing the whistle blowers. The whistle blowers were terrorized by private investigators, were threatened, and were either suspended or fired.

Coleman was processed through this "system".

http://judicialmisconduct.blogspot.com/2007/1...

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William "Bill" Coleman can get almost a decade in prison for allegedly raping his wife during a custody battle over children.

Some women in similar situations are cunning, conniving, and almost willing to do anything to keep a Father of children away from them, seize all assets, cash, and property, and ruin the Father, so he is unable to see the children again, or even ends up in prison. [click here] for Chris Kennedy and Bill Cosby on the subject of fatherlessness and fatherhood.

I see that vindictive mothers and ex-wives are capable of just about anything, over and over.

Chris Kennedy's ex-wife stabbed him during a custody dispute in Connecticut. His wife was awarded full custody of the children while she was awaiting court hearings on her felony first degree assault charges. Chris complained, so the charges against Leanne Putnam were dropped so that Chris Kennedy could face a $500,000 bond after being arrested and facing 30 years in prison for his having accidentally checked the wrong box on a family court financial form.

After I was sentenced to a year in prison for having resisted being mugged on my former Connecticut property in Stafford Springs, I read while in prison, that a habitual criminal gang member had raped his girlfriend and was give probation, no prison! I also read where a habitual, youthful offender got 10 years of probation, no prison for armed robbery!

I had to "re-enter" society after having resisted being beaten up, fearing for my life, I ended the beating I was taking with pepper spray. The felon, would be mugger, was not even arrested. Now I am labeled an "Ex-con" unable to get most jobs and apartments. I was current on 3 mortgages and had a small business built over 2 decades at the time I was falsely arrested. My prison sentence ended the relationship I had with my daughter.

A US Marine, Stephen Murzin, coming home to the State of Connecticut and witnessed a man, Phillip Inkel, being beaten up at the Colchester, Connecticut, McDonald's by police. Inkel had witnessed a teen being beaten up at the same Colchester McDonald's and lodged a police misconduct complaint. The teen had been beaten up by police for wearing baggy pants. Inkel was being beaten up for lodging a police misconduct complaint. Murzin lodged a police misconduct complaint, so police abducted Stephen and his brother Ian and beat them at Troop K, Connecticut State Police HQ.

Ian may have been strangled to death and then revived by police at Troop K. For complaining about the beating and police brutality, police paid Todd Vashon [video, Vashon under oath], a state registered police confidential informant $10,000 to kill Murzin and Inkel. [story with video]

When Vashon got cold feet informant, David J. Taylor, a felon on probation stabbed Murzin 13 times along with two other people. A Connecticut Judge and prosecutors saw no need to violate Taylor on probation for almost killing 3 people.

But police were so upset with Murzin having caused a disturbance being stabbed, when he woke up alive in the hospital with 13 stab wounds he was arrested by police and faced 6 months in prison for his "offense".

So, even if Coleman is guilty of raping his wife, his sentence isn't consistent with others.

If police, judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers act like they do above, who really should be in prison for eight years, Coleman, or the police, prosecutors, and judges mentioned above?

-Steven G. Erickson
stevengerickson@yahoo.com

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[click here] for photo montage of Connecticut Public Corruption

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Victim on Secret Police Enemies List, Stephen Murzin speaks about various incidents


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Kenneth Krayeske, former Green Party campaign manager for Connecticut governor, and a journalist, was placed on the Connecticut State Police "Secret Enemies List" and was arrested on sight. So, in the "New America" you can be arrested on sight, spied on, terrorized, and imprisoned for Free Speech, your politics, or just because you are in the way of police, judges, or corrupt politicians. [more]

Prosecuting George W. Bush domestically and/or internationally

Embassy

Paraguay

2400 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington DC 20008

Telephone: (202) 483-6960
Fax: (202) 234-4508
E-mail: secretaria@embaparusa.gov.py
URL: http://www.embaparusa.gov.py/

The United States Information Service (USIS) office in Asuncion is on the Web.

The Embassy of Paraguay is located on "Embassy Row," on Massachusetts Avenue.

http://www.embassy.org/embassies/py.html

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Text of email to Paraguay Embassy in Washington, DC:

To whom it may concern:
It has been alleged that George W. Bush and his family members bought property in Paraguay because Paraguay doesn't have an extradition treaty with the US, and Bush could flee the US to Paraguay to avoid extradition and prosecution. Will you answer my questions posed to you, so I may post your answer on http://judicialmisconduct.blogspot.com/?

If US citizens in the US travel to Paraguay is it possible to sue George W. Bush for damages his Presidency caused to US citizens to seize ownership of his properties if there is a judgment in your civil court system in our favor?

Does Paraguay recognize the International World Court, The Hague? If so, and if George W. Bush is in Paraguay, could George W. Bush be extradited to the Hague for prosecution for Crimes Against Humanity, for War Crimes, and for the murder of US Citizens due to his lying the US into a ground war with Iraq ?

Please get back to me with answers ASAP.

Thank you,

Steven G. Erickson
stevengerickson@yahoo.com
PO Box Eight Seventy-Four
Brattleboro, VT 05302 USA